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INSURANCE - STATUTES - STACKING OF UNINSURED MOTORIST AND
NO-FAULT COVERAGES AS DETERMINED BY LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Eileen Andrews, qualifying as an insured' under an
automobile insurance policy providing mandatory uninsured
motorist coverage and no-fault benefits, 2 received serious injuries
in an automobile accident involving an uninsured motorist. 3 Ms.
Andrews' father, the principal insured, submitted a claim
attempting to stack4 the applicable insurance coverages. Andrews'
insurer, the St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company, then initiated a
suit to determine the extent of its liability.5 The issues presented to
the North Dakota Supreme Court involved whether North Dakota
law prohibited the stacking of certain insurance benefits. 6 The
1. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 321 N.W.2d 483 (N.D. 1982). Conrad Andrews, the
principal insured, identified his daughter Eileen as an "occasional operator" of his 1976 Honda
Hatchback. Id. at 484. Eileen qualified as an insured under the terms of the appropriate insurance
policy. Id.
2. Id. Conrad Andrews owned three automobiles, all insured under a single policy issued by the
plaintiff and appellant, St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company. Id.
3. Id. at 484-85. On July 15, 1979, Eileen sustained serious injuries in a one-car accident. She
was a passenger in a car owned by Randy Johnson and driven by Dale Anderson. The car involved
in the accident was an uninsured motor vehicle, and no insurance was applicable to RandyJohnson
or Dale Anderson. Eileen's injuries far exceeded the total benefits payable, even if North Dakota law
permitted the stacking of uninsured motorist and no-fault coverage. Id.
4. See Comment, When Enough Isn't Enough: Supplementing Uninsured Motorist Coverage in
Pennsylvania, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 281 (1981). The Comment defines stacking as follows:
The stacking or pyramiding of coverages usually denotes the availability of more than
one policy to the same insured. The effect of allowing dual [uninsured motorist]
recovery is to permit stacking. "Stacking," where permitted, makes more than one
policy fully available to the injured party without proration between the companies
held liable. The word "stacking," as used in the argot of the insurance industry,
implies and is intended to be used when one policy's limit is "stacked" on top of
another and possibly a third is "stacked" on top of the second. The claim is not paid
by slicing through the stack like a piece of wedding cake but is paid by first using one
layer, then another, and so on.
Id. at 282 n.5 (quoting P. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS 87-88 (1972)).
5. 321 N.W.2d at 485.
6. Id. at 484. The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the issues presented by the stacking
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court held that North Dakota law did not prohibit stacking of
uninsured motorist coverage, 7 that North Dakota law prohibited
stacking of no-fault insurance benefits, 8 and that an insurance
policy provision that prohibited stacking of uninsured motorist
coverage was valid and enforceable in North Dakota. 9 St. Paul
Mercury Insurance Co. v. Andrews, 321 N.W.2d 483 (N.D. 1982).
The concept of stacking, which allows an insured to recover
under multiple insurance coverages, involves an area of the law in
which no majority rule has developed.' 0 Because of the split in
authority it is important to grasp the basic ideas presented by both
uninsured motorist and no-fault insurance coverages.
The objective of uninsured motorist coverage is to provide a
source of indemnification for an injured insured when no liability
insurance coverage is applicable to the negligent motorist.'" An
insurer pays the uninsured motorist coverage proceeds to the
insured when the insured receives personal injuries as a result of the
negligence of an uninsured motorist. 12
Uninsured motorist coverage varies from liability coverage in
three significant ways. The most significant distinction is that
uninsured motorist coverage is direct or first-party coverage
because the payments of the insurance benefits go directly to the
insured.' 3 Liability insurance is third-party coverage because the
insurance payments go to the injured third party as a result of
of uninsured motorist and no-fault coverages. Id. Section 26-02-42 of the North Dakota Century
Code defines the extent of uninsured motorist coverage, and chapter 26-41 of the North Dakota
Century Code addresses no-fault coverage. Id. (construing N.D. CENT. CODE 5 26-02-42 (1978); id.
ch. 26-41).
7. 321 N.W.2d at 486. The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the District Court of Cass
County and concluded that there was no legislative intent to prohibit the stacking of uninsured
motorist coverage. Id.
8. Id. at 489. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the Cass County District Court's
opinion and concluded that the no-fault statute was a no-stacking statute. Id.
9. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the policy limitation violated no
established public policy and was enforceable. Id.
10. Id. at 486. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that decisions from other juris-
dictions were not persuasive because no majority rule has developed. Id. See also Comment, Intra-
Policy Stacking of Uninsured Motorist and Medical Payments Coverages: To Be or Not To Be, 22 S.D.L. REV.
349 (1977). The author points out the split in authority regarding the allowance of intrapolicy
stacking of uninsured motorist coverages. Id. at 351. Of the 23 states that have dealt with the issue of
intrapolicy stacking of uninsured motorist coverages, 13 have refused to allow such stacking. Id.
11. A. WIDiss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE § 1.1 (1969). The author indicates
that the need to recover damages for injuries suffered in an automobile accident historically
developed from an allocation of fault theory. After World War II, however, the need to provide a
source of indemnification for injuries suffered because of the negligence of financially irresponsible
individuals greatly increased. The current uninsured motorist provisions are attempts to meet the
need for indemnification. Id.
12. M. WOODROOF, F. FONSECA & A. SQUILLANTE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND No-FAULT LAW
55 7.2, 7.3 (1974 & Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as M. WOODROOF]. The authors point out that
uninsured motorist coverage is a means of protecting the insured and his family from the negligence
of those individuals who do not carry liability insurance. Uninsured motorist coverage differs from
no-fault coverage and is available only if the insured is not negligent. Id. § 7. 1.
13. Id. § 1.18.
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liability incurred by the insured first party.' 4 Therefore, liability
coverage protects innocent third parties from the negligent driving
of an insured first party, while uninsured motorist coverage
protects the insured first party from an uninsured third party.' 5
The second distinction is that uninsured motorist coverage is
personal to the insured, while liability coverage follows a particular
insured automobile.' 6 A third distinction is that uninsured motorist
coverage extends coverage to any passengers in the vehicle insured
under the uninsured motorist policy." Liability insurance extends
coverage only to the negligent operation of an automobile by the
insured or his permittee.' 8
In 1971 the North Dakota Legislature mandated that each
liability insurance policy issued within North Dakota must include
an endorsement for uninsured motorist coverage.' 9 In 1975 the
legislature mandated that liability coverage must be in effect before
any vehicle may be driven in this state. 20 Thus, North Dakota
strictly requires all residents obtaining insurance on their
14. Id. § 1.19. The authors contend that the nature of liability insurance is now thought of as
protection for the potential victim of the accident, rather than insurance providing protection for the
party found liable. Id.
15. See Note, Twenty-Five Years of Uninsured Motorist Coverage: A Silver Anniversary Cloud with a
Tarnished Lining, 14 IND. L. REv. 671 (1981). It is important to distinguish uninsured motorist
coverage from liability coverage because of the practice of including uninsured motorist coverage as a
part of, or an endorsement to, an automobile liability policy. Id. at 676.
16. A. WwIss, supra note 11, § 2.8. It is important that uninsured motorist coverage is personal
to the insured because this insurance may be available to an insured if he sustains injuries in a
nonowned automobile. Id.
17. A. WmIss, supra note 11, § 2.8.
18. Note, supra note 15, at 676-77. The basic differences between liability and uninsured
motorist coverages illustrate that the risk involved in insuring against loss is vastly different under
each coverage. Id.
19. Mandatory Uninsured Motorist Coverage Act, ch. 279, § 1, 1971 N.D. Sess. Laws 633
(codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-02-42 (1978)). The Act provides:
No motor vehicle liability policy of insurance against loss resulting from liability
imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of
ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for
delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally
garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto in
amounts not less than that set forth in section 39-16.1-11 for bodily injury or death, for
the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor
vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting
therefrom.
Id.
20. Driving Without Insurance Act, ch. 340, § 2, 1975 N.D. Sess. Laws 967 (codified at N.D.
CErr. CODE § 39-08-20 (1980)). Originally, § 39-08-20 provided as follows:
No person shall drive a motor vehicle in this state without a valid policy of
liability insurance in effect in order to respond in damages for liability arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, or use of such vehicle in the amount required by chapter
39-16.1. No statutory fee shall be assessed for a violation of this section.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-20 (1980) (amended 1981). The 1981 legislature removed the last sentence
from § 39-08-20. Liability Insurance Act, ch. 391, § 3, 1981 N.D. Sess. Laws 1125 (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE § 39-08-20 (Supp. 1981)).
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automobiles to carry uninsured motorist coverage in their liability
policies. 21 Neither the company nor the individual may waive the
coverage. 22 The uninsured motorist legislation in effect at the time
of Ms. Andrews' accident provided that an insurer must provide a
minimum of $25,000 coverage for bodily injuries suffered by one
individual in an automobile accident. 23
The 1975 legislative session also mandated that insurers must
provide no-fault automobile insurance. 24 The North Dakota Auto
Accident Reparations Act, 25 North Dakota's legislative enactment
of no-fault insurance law, took effect onJanuary 1, 1976.26 The Act
provides that when a person sustains bodily injuries in a motor
vehicle accident, he will recover from the insurance applicable to
the motor vehicle in which he receives his injuries, regardless of
fault or negligence. 27 North Dakota's no-fault insurance law applies
21. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-20 (Supp. 1981). See M. WOODROOF, supra note 12, 5 7.2. All
states require uninsured motorist coverage, but three different definitions exist that explain the term
"require." Many states require that the insurance companies make uninsured motorist coverage
available to those who specifically request it. Some states require that the insurance companies
include the uninsured motorist coverage as a part of the policy, but allow the insured to refuse the
coverage by an endorsement. The other states strictly require residents to carry uninsured motorist
coverage in their automobile insurance policies. Id.
22. M. WOODROOF, supra note 12, § 7.2.
23. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-16.1-11(2) (b) (1980). Subsection (2) (b) provides:
2. Such owner's policy of liability insurance:
b. Shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using
such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of
such named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicles within
the United States of America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits
exclusive of interest and costs, with respect to each such motor vehicle, as
follows: twenty-five thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one
person in any one accident and subject to said limit for one person, fifty
thousand dollars because of bodily inury to or death of two or more persons in
any one accident, and ten thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction
of property of others in any one accident.
Id.
24. Auto Accident Reparations Act, ch. 265, 1975 N.D. Sess. Laws 796-810 (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE ch. 26-41 (1978 & Supp. 1981)). The Act authorized no-fault automobile insurance
when it provided in part:
AN ACT to provide for the compensation of injured persons resulting from motor
vehicle accidents; for security for motor vehicles on a compulsory basis; for certain
mandatory minimum insurance or self-insurance protection benefits payable
regardless of fault in cases of accidental bodily injury; for an exemption for secured
persons from general damages; for subrogation, intercompany arbitration, and offset
of benefits paid against judgments; for an assigned claims plan; for a mandatory
offering of excess optional no-fault benefits; to create and enact new subsections to
sections 39-04-05 and 39-04-06 relating to the suspension or revocation of motor
vehicle registration for failure to have security in effect as required by this Act;
providing an effective date; and providing an appropriation.
Id. at 796.
25. N.D. Cent. Code ch. 26-41 (1978 & Supp. 1981).
26. Auto Accident Reparations Act, supra note 24, at 810.
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-07 (1978). See Smith, "North Dakota Auto Accident Reparations Act"
- North Dakota's No-Fault Insurance Law, 52 N.D.L. REv. 147 (1975). The author examines the no-
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only to bodily injuries and does not provide compensation for
property damage.
2 8
Pure no-fault insurance coverage "envisions a change in our
present system of auto accident reparation." ' 29 Pure no-fault is
"compulsory and exclusive of our present tort liability system." 30
No-fault insurance, through first-party insurance coverage,
compensates accident victims for economic loss regardless of
fault. 31 No-fault insurance also abolishes tort liability for economic
loss except in certain situations.3 2 The Uniform Motor Vehicle
Accident Reparations Act, 33 from which North Dakota's no-fault
laws developed, proposes a complete system of reparations for
injuries and losses arising from motor vehicle accidents.3 4
The occasion to stack insurance coverages occurs only when
an insured has suffered damages that exceed the coverage limits
provided in an insurance policy. 3 5 Stacking insurance coverages
becomes an issue in three basic situations. 36
The first example of an occasion to stack insurance coverages
arises because North Dakota law requires an insured to have
insurance coverage on his motor vehicle, and many of the
nonowned motor vehicles in which the insured rides provide
insurance coverage for passengers. If the insured sustains injuries
while riding as a passenger in a nonowned vehicle, the insured may
qualify as an insured under both policies.3 7 If the insured suffers
damages in excess of the policy limits applicable to the motor
vehicle in which the insured was riding, the insured probably will
seek the additional benefits of his own insurance policy. Thus, the
insured may attempt to stack the benefits of his own policy on top of
the benefits attributable to the nonowned vehicle.
3 8
fault insurance requirements for North Dakota and attempts to provide answers for no-fault
insurance questions that may arise. Id.
28. Smith, supra note 27, at 149. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-03(2) (1978).
29. M. WOODROOF, supra note 12, § 14.1.
30. M. WOODROOF, supra note 12, § 14.1. The authors maintain that a direct compensation plan
of payments, made without regard to fault, replaces the right to sue in tort based on fault. Id.
31. M. WOODROOF, supra note 12, 5 14.41.
32. See M. WOODROOF, supra note 12, § 14.44.
33. UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 41 (1980 & Supp. 1982).
In 1972 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform
Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (UMVARA). Id. UMVARA has not received approval
from the American Bar Association, however, and no state legislature has adopted UMVARA in its
entirety. Id.
34. Id. For a list of the appropriate statutes and the states that have enacted various types of no-
fault legislation, see M. WOODROOF, supra note 12, ch. 18, at 189 (Supp. 1982).
35. For example, if an insured suffers damages of $50,000 and qualifies as an insured under two
policies, each providing a maximum of $25,000 coverage, the issue of insurance stacking arises.
Conversely, if the insured suffers damages of $15,000 and is an insured on the same two policies, the
issue of stacking does not arise.
36. Note, supra note 15, at 67.9.
37. Note, supra note 15, at 679.
38. Note, supra note 15, at 679.
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A second example of an occasion to stack insurance benefits
occurs when the insured owns more than one motor vehicle, with
each insured by a separate insurance policy. The insured qualifies
as an insured under each of the policies. If the insured sustains
injuries in an accident involving one of the insured motor vehicles,
the insured may attempt to stack the coverage limit for each motor
vehicle.3 9 Such an attempt at stacking is known as interpolicy
stacking.40
The third example of an occasion for stacking insurance
coverages involves intrapolicy stacking. 41 This situation occurs
when the insured owns more than one motor vehicle, but one
insurance policy covers all the motor vehicles. If the insured
sustains injuries while occupying one of his vehicles, he may
attempt to stack the coverages applicable to each motor vehicle
covered under the single insurance policy.
42
The factual situation presented to the North Dakota Supreme
Court in Andrews involved intrapolicy stacking of uninsured
motorist and no-fault coverages. 43 Eileen Andrews sustained
injuries while riding as a passenger in an uninsured motor vehicle
driven by an uninsured motorist. 44  Andrews' insurer paid
uninsured motorist and no-fault benefits because of the accident,
but did not stack the coverages of three vehicles insured under the
policy.4
5
The first issue presented to the court in Andrews was whether
North Dakota law prohibited the stacking of uninsured motorist
coverage. 46 An interpretation of section 26-02-42 of the North
Dakota Century Code47 revealed to the court that North Dakota
law did not prohibit stacking of uninsured motorist coverages. 48
39. Note, supra note 15, at 679.
40. Comment, Intra-Policy Stacking of Uninsured Motorist and Medical Payments Coverages: To Be or
Not to Be, 22 S.D.L. REv. 349, 350 (1977). Interpolicy stacking involves the stacking of more than
one policy and allows the aggregation of insurance coverages to compensate the insured for damages
sustained. Id.
41. Id. Intrapolicy stacking involves an attempt to stack coverages provided by a single policy.
Id.
42. Id. The author indicates that a split in authority exists regarding the allowability of
intrapolicy stacking. Id. at 351.
43. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 321 N.W.2d 483, 484 (N.D. 1982). St. Paul
Mercury Insurance Company issued an insurance policy to Mr. Andrews that covered his 1976
Honda Hatchback. The company later amended the policy to provide coverage for Mr. Andrews'
1970 Chevrolet Camaro and 1979 Honda station wagon. Id.
44. Id. at 485.
45. Id. See Smith, supra note 27, at 153. The primary obligation to pay no-fault benefits falls on
the insurer of the vehicle in which the injuries were sustained. Id. Only when an insured occupies an
uninsured motor vehicle and sustains injuries will the insured's insurer be liable for both uninsured
motorist and no-fault benefits. Id.
46. 321 N.W.2d at 485.
47. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-02-42 (1978). For the text of § 26-02-42, see supra note 19.
48. 321 N.W.2d at 486.
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Previous North Dakota case law raised only peripherally the
issue of stacking. The court in St. Alexius Hospital v. Eckert49 allowed
the stacking of uninsured motorist coverages in dictum, based on
the premise that an insured could take advantage of his paid up
coverage. 50 Because the language from St. Alexius Hospital v. Eckert
was dictum, the court in Andrews looked to other areas of North
Dakota law to verify the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage. 51
The court's analysis centered around a judicial interpretation
of the legislation authorizing compulsory uninsured motorist
coverage. 52 Statutory guidelines exist that govern the court's
authority to interpret legislation enacted by the North Dakota
Legislature. 53 The occasion for judicial interpretation occurred
because the legislation did not specifically address the stacking
issue.
54
The court determined that the wording of the uninsured
motorist coverage statute was not ambiguous, and thus, no
extrinsic evidence was necessary to explain the intent of the
legislation. 55 The court recognized the established legislative
practice of placing specific words of prohibition in legislation when
the legislature intended a prohibition. 56 Because the uninsured
49. 284 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1979). The court held that "coordination of benefits" within North
Dakota's no-fault legislation could be construed as preventing duplication of payments. St. Alexius
Hosp. v. Eckert, 284 N.W.2d 441, 445 (N.D. 1979). The "coordination of benefits" did not prevent
an allocation of losses among different insurers in situations in which total economic loss exceeded
no-fault benefits. Id. at 446.
50. Id.
51. 321 N.W.2d at 485. TheAndrews court noted that the federal court in Hughes v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 604 F.2d 573, 580 (8th Cir. 1979), raised the stacking issue, but did not
analyze it. 321 N.W.2d at 485.
52. 321 N.W.2d at 485.
53. N.D. CErr. CODE §§ 1-02-05, -39 (1975). Section 1-02-05 provides: "When the wording of
a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit." Id. § 1-02-05.
Section 1-02-39 provides:
If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the
legislation, may consider among other matters:
1. The object sought to be attained.
2. The circumstances under which the statute was enacted.
3. The legislative history.
4. The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same
or similar subjects.
5. The consequences of a particular construction.
6. The administrative construction of the statute.
7. The preamble.
Id. § 1-02-39.
54. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-02-42 (1978). Section 26-02-42 does not address the stacking
issue. For the text of § 26-02-42, see supra note 19.
55. 321 N.W.2d at 485.
56. Id. at 486 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-30-03 (1978) (unfair methods of competition or
unfair and deceptive acts or practices are specifically prohibited)); id. §§ 26-05-06 to -08
(procurement of double insurance is specifically prohibited); id. §§ 26-03-48, 26-04-04, 26-26-15, 26-
27-15 (over insurance prohibited).
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motorist coverage statute did not specifically prohibit stacking of
coverages, the court concluded that North Dakota law permitted
stacking of uninsured motorist coverage.
57
The Andrews court also examined the uninsured motorist
coverage statute as if a latent ambiguity did exist5 8 The court
stated that most of the statutory guidelines of section 1-02-39 of the
North Dakota Century Code5 9 were inapplicable. 60 The court,
thus, concentrated its analysis on the appropriateness of following
the contemporaneous construction of similar statutes by other
jurisdictions. 61 This analysis was inconclusive because of the lack of
uniformity among the statutes that have mandated uninsured
motorist coverage. 62  The court continued the analysis by
examining judicial decisions regarding the appropriateness of
stacking uninsured motorist coverages. 63 Judicial stacking decisions
failed to establish a "bright line" of majority rule. 64 Because a
majority rule failed to appear, the court did not accept the judicial
interpretations of other jurisdictions that had dealt with the
stacking issue.
65
Because an examination of the law of other jurisdictions was
inconclusive, 66 the ascertainment of legislative intent was the most
important factor in the court's decision. 67 Stacking was never
described as inherently wrong and the legislature did not
specifically prohibit stacking, therefore, the court concluded that
57. 321 N.W.2d at 486. The court concluded that "the legislature did not intend to prohibit
'stacking' of uninsured motorist coverage." Id.
58. Id. at 485-86.
59. For the text of N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-39 (1975), see supra note 53.
60. 321 N.W.2d at 485-86.
61. Id. at 486. In Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. State, 274 N.W.2d 580 (N.D. 1979), the
court stated, "The presumption is still valid that when we adopt a statute from another jurisdiction,
we adopt the contemporaneous construction of its provisions by the courts of that jurisdiction." Id.
at 582 (citing Hermanson v. Morrell, 252 N.W.2d 884 (N.D. 1977)). The court in Andrews, however,
did not follow the established rule concerning contemporaneous construction of similar statutes
because of a lack of uniformity among existing uninsured motorist legislation. 321 N.W.2d at 486.
62. 321 N.W.2d at 486. For a discussion of various uninsured motorist requirements, see supra
note 21 and acompanying text.
63. 321 N.W.2d at 486.
64. Id. The following are a few of the recent decisions decided in favor of stacking uninsured
motorist coverages: Davis v. Hughes, 229 Kan. 91, 622 P.2d 641 (1981) (intrapolicy stacking of
uninsured motorist coverages allowed); Chaffee v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 181 Mont. 1,
591 P.2d 1102 (1979) (insured allowed to stack uninsured motorist coverages when insured paid
separate premiums for three vehicles); Richardson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 594 (Okla. 1980)
(intrapolicy stacking of uninsured motorist coverages allowed).
The following cases did not allow the stacking of uninsured motorist coverages: Holland v.
Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co., 230 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa 1975) (uninsured motorist coverage on nine vehicles
owned by insured was not stackable); Pettid v. Edwards, 195 Neb. 713, 240 N.W.2d 344 (1976)
(stacking of uninsured motorist coverages not allowed because antistacking policy limitations were
valid); Cunningham v. Wester Casualty & Sur. Co., 90 S.D. 530, 243 N.W.2d 172 (1976)
(appropriate statutes did not allow stacking of uninsured motorist coverages).





the legislature did not intend to prohibit the stacking of uninsured
motorist coverages.
68
The second issue presented to the court in Andrews was
whether North Dakota law prohibited the stacking of basic no-fault
provisions. 69 This was another issue of first impression for the
North Dakota Supreme Court, and thus, the court cited no case
law to support its final decision. 70 The court interpreted the North
Dakota Auto Accident Reparations Act7 to prohibit the stacking of
no-fault benefits. 
72
The court interpreted the language of the North Dakota Auto
Accident Reparations Act according to the established guidelines
for interpreting uniform laws. 73 The North Dakota Auto Accident
Reparations Act is a uniform law, derived from the Uniform Motor
Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (UMVARA). 74 Various states
have adopted portions of UMVARA, but no state has adopted
UMVARA in its entirety. 7 Because no-fault laws vary from state
to state, the court could not turn to another jurisdiction for
guidance in deciding the stacking issue.
76
The court searched for alternate sources to answer the stacking
question because of the lack of uniformity among state statutes and
judicial stacking decisions. 77 The court quoted extensively from
Appleman's treatise, Insurance Law and Practice, to justify its decision
68. Id.
69. Id. at 486-87.
70. Id. at 486-89. The court based its decision entirely upon an interpretation of chapter 26-41
of the North Dakota Century Code and the incorporated analysis ofJohn Appleman, an insurance
law treatise author. Id.
71. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 26-41 (1978 & Supp. 1981).
72. 321 N.W.2d at 489. In reversing the trial court's decision, the court specifically dealt with
§ 26-41-03(2) of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. at 488-89. Section 26-41-03(2) provides:
"Basic no-fault benefits" means benefits for economic loss resulting from accidental
bodily injury. The maximum amount of basic no-fault benefits payable for all
economic loss incurred and resulting from accidental bodily injury to any one person
as the result of any one accident shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars, regardless of
the number of persons entitled to such benefits or the number of basic no-fault insurers
obligated to pay such benefits. Basic no-fault benefits payable shall not exceed one
hundred and fifty dollars per week per person prorated for any lesser period for work
loss or survivors income loss, or one thousand dollars for funeral, cremation, and
burial expenses.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-03(2) (1978).
73. 321 N.W.2d at 487. The court interpreted the North Dakota Auto Accident Reparations
Act according to the guidelines established in § 1-02-13 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id.
Section 1-02-13 provides: "Any provision of code which is part of a uniform statute shall be so
construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-13 (1975).
74. 321 N.W.2d at 487. The court stated, "[Unless one believes in a miraculous coincidence in
choice of words or widespread plagiarism, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that North Dakota
and many other jurisdictions have enacted parts of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident
Reparations Act, and efforts ought to extend toward uniform construction." Id.
75. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
76. 321 N.W.2d at 487.
77. Id.
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that the legislature intended to prohibit the stacking of no-fault
insurance benefits.78  Appleman's no-fault stacking analysis
concentrated on the various justifications given by courts that
allowed the stacking of no-fault benefits.
79
One major justification for allowing the stacking of no-fault
benefits is the argument that if a person pays for insurance benefits,
that person should be able to recover the benefits. 80 In Wasche v.
Milbank Mutual Insurance Co. 81 the Minnesota Supreme Court
adopted this justification and allowed the stacking of no-fault
benefits. 82 Appleman, however, criticized courts that rely upon that
reasoning to allow stacking of insurance coverages. 83 Appleman
stated, "[T]he proper rule remains that liability is not increased by
the fact that a separate premium was charged for each such
coverage relating to the several vehicles, or for nonowned
coverage.''84 Various courts had allowed the insured to recover
increased benefits in this situation because of public policy. 85 The
Nevada Supreme Court in Cooke v. Safeco Insurance Co. 86 stated that
public policy prevented the insurance company from limiting
liability to single recovery when the insured paid two premiums for
two separate no-fault coverages.
8 7
78. Id. 8DJ. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5192, at 613 (1981). The discussion of
the various courts that lump the different problems of interpolicy stacking and intrapolicy stacking
into a single category is confusing and inaccurate from an insurance law point of view. The author
recommends that courts employ greater selectivity ofjudicial language in the future, depending upon
the circumstances presented. Id.
79. 8DJ. APPLEMAN, supra note 78. at 608-12.
80. 8DJ. APPLEMAN, supra note 78, at 608. The author states that prostacking decisions hold that
an insured may recover under each coverage regardless of the number of policies issued. Id. See also
Esler v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 273 S.C. 259, 255 S.E.2d 676 (1979) (intrapolicy stacking of no-
fault benefits allowed to compensate a bicyclist injured when struck by an automobile).
81. 268 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 1978). Mrs. Wasche, a Minnesota resident, sustained injuries in
an automobile accident while visiting in California. Mrs. Wasche subsequently died with medical
bills totaling $46,913.40 and funeral expenses totaling $1,966. Mrs. Wasche was a resident of her
daughter-in-law's household, and her daughter-in-law had two automobiles, each covered by no-
fault insurance. The court allowed the stacking of coverages to the policy limits to provide $40,000
for medical expenses and $1,966 for funeral expenses. Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268
N.W.2d 913, 915, 920 (Minn. 1978).
82. Id. at 919. The court concluded:
[W]e hold that under the present statute the injured person shall be allowed to recover
basic economic loss benefits under each no-fault coverage applicable to him as an
insured to the extent of actual losses up to the stacked policy limits of all policies
applicable on a single priority level.
Id.
83. 8cJ. APPLEMAN, supra note 78, 5 5106, at 528-31.
84. 8eJ. APPLEMAN, supra note 78, § 5106, at 531.
85. 8DJ. APPLEMAN, supra note 78, § 5192, at 608-15. The author stated that one prostacking
justification cited by state courts was that state public policy did not permit the enforcement of
certain policy limitations. Id. at 612.
86. 94 Nev. 745, 587 P.2d 1324 (1978). Mrs. Cooke died as a result of serious injuries suffered
in an automobile accident. The court allowed the stacking of two no-fault policies to defray the
greater portion of medical bills incurred by Mrs. Cooke before she died. Cooke v. Safeco Ins. Co., 94




The North Dakota Supreme Court apparently agreed with
Appleman's criticism of the prostacking arguments and concluded
that public policy did not require the stacking of no-fault
coverages. 88 Thus, the ascertainment of legislative intent was the
key determinant in deciding that the North Dakota Auto Accident
Reparations Act prohibited stacking.89 The Andrews court believed
the intent of the legislature was clear 90 when the North Dakota
Legislature stated, "[T]he maximum amount of basic no-fault
benefits payable . ..shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars." 91
The court was unwilling to judicially expand the legislative
language and concluded that the legislature intended to prohibit the
stacking of no-fault benefits.
92
The final issue in Andrews was whether North Dakota law
permitted the enforcement of an insurance policy limitation 93 that
barred the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage. 94 The
insurance policy was an adhesion contract, and thus, was construed
most strongly against the insurance company. 95 The review of an
adhesion contract requires special scrutiny to assure that an
application of the contract does not occur in an unfair and
unconscionable manner against the party who did not participate in
its drafting. 96 The Andrews court determined that the insurance
88. Andrews, 321 N.W.2d at 488.
89. Id.
90. Id. The court concluded the legislature intended to limit the availability of no-fault insur-
ance because of the limiting provisions of the North Dakota Auto Accident Reparations Act. Compare
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-03(2) (1978) (basic no-fault benefits apply to economic loss resulting from
accidental injury and are limited to $15,000 per accident) with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3107
(1983) (personal protection insurance benefits are payable for all reasonable charges incurred for
reasonably necessary products, services, and accommodations for an injured person's care, recovery,
or rehabilitation) and UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS ACT.
§ 1(a)(2) (1972) (basic reparation benefits means benefits providing reimbursement for net loss
suffered through injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle).
91. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-03(2) (1978).
92. 321 N.W.2d at 489.
93. Id. The insurance policy provides in part:
"The limit ofliability shown in the Declarations for 'each person' for Uninsured
Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury
sustained by any one person in any one auto accident. Subject to this limit for 'each
person,' the limit of liability shown in the Declarations for 'each accident' for
Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for
bodily injury resulting from any one auto accident.
This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of covered persons, claims




95. Id. In Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1976), the
insured sustained injuries while riding a snowmobile. The court determined that the snowmobile was
a motor vehicle, and thus, the insurer was responsible for providing coverage. Id at 886. The rule
regarding interpretation of adhesion contracts was developed in Bekken v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W.200(1940). Hughes, 236 N.W.2d at 885.
96. See State v. Bismarck Tire Center, Inc., 234 N.W.2d 224 (N.D. 1975). An employment
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policy limitation provisions were enforceable, 97 even though the
special scrutiny standard of review existed. Therefore, Eileen
Andrews received only the $25,000 single policy limit instead of the
$75,000 stacked limit of uninsured motorist coverage.
98
The enforcement of the limitation provision reinforces the
court's urgent call for legislative action. In each of the three issues
addressed by the court, the court invited legislative action to either
affirm or disaffirm the court's decisions. 99 The decisions in St. Paul
Mercury Insurance Co. v. Andrews leave the entire area of insurance
policy stacking unsettled. Until legislative action is taken, the
rulings in Andrews stand to permit stacking of uninsured motorist
coverage and to prohibit stacking of no-fault benefits.
The issue of stacking may not arise in North Dakota in the
future because of the ruling regarding the enforceability of
insurance policy limitation provisions. Insurance companies likely
will put an antistacking provision in all automobile insurance
policies. Because these contractual limitations are valid in North
Dakota, stacking, even though permitted by judicial decision, will
not be allowed. The decision in Andrews stresses the urgent need for
legislative direction in the area of insurance policy stacking.
DENNIS H. SIMPSON
contract entitled an employee to vacation time, and the employee's termination of employment did
not forfeit his vested right to vacation time. The court stated that an employment contract was a
contract of adhesion. Id. at 225. The court concluded, "An agreement which is essentially a 'contract
of adhesion' should be examined with special scrutiny by the courts to assure that it is not applied in
an unfair or unconscionable manner against the party who did not participate in its drafting." Id. at
225-26 (quoting Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n v. Nelson, 233 N.W.2d 494, 497 (N.D.
1974)).
97. 321 N.W.2d at 489.
98. See id. The undisputed facts state that Eileen Andrews received damages in excess of the
insurance coverages, even if stacked. The enforceability of the policy limitation provision arguably
leads to an unfair and unconscionable result against the party who did not participate in the drafting
of the insurance policy.
99. Id. at 486, 489. Some courts that have addressed stacking "have arbitrarily stated that
'public policy' prohibits 'stacking,' while other courts have arbitrarily stated that 'public policy'
permits 'stacking.' This merely illustrates how clearly legislative the determination is and should
be." Id. at 48 9 .
